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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent article on ethical negotiation begins with the somber
observation that, in negotiations, attorneys lie.' They lie "about their
goals, priorities, interests;.. .reservation point[s];... alternative[s];
... [and] objective standards." 2 In short, they would lie about nearly
anything "that [could] impact the perceived strength and weakness of
their side." 3 If true, many attorneys routinely violate Model Rule of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) Rule 4.1,4 as drafted by the American
Bar Association (ABA) and adopted in some variation by 49 states. 5
Rule 4.1 forbids attorneys from either affirmatively misrepresenting a
fact or the law or omitting a material fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a client's fraudulent or criminal act.6
To characterize the majority of attorneys as licensed liars is
hyperbole, but this particular hyperbole contains more than a grain of
an (inconvenient) truth: Professors Hinshaw & Alberts's empirical
study of attorneys' negotiation ethics concluded that an "unacceptably
high number of attorneys indicate they would be willing to engage in a
fraudulent.. .negotiation.. .if asked to do so by their client."'7 They found
that 30% were willing to accede to a client's request that they withhold
a material fact in direct contravention of Rule 4.1.8 Worse yet, an even
' James K.L. Lawrence, Lying, Misrepresenting, Puffing and Bluffing: Legal,
Ethical and Professional Standards forNegotiators and Mediation Advocates, 29 OHIO




4 Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of
Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV.NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 102(2011).
' See id. at 101 (noting that all states except California have their own versions of
Rule 4.1).
6 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2016). Rule 4.1(b) permits omissions if
Rule 1.6, the MRPC's confidentiality provision, would prohibit disclosure of a client's
confidences.
7 Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 163.8 1d. at 145.
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higher proportion believed that Rule 4.1 violations are pervasive among
attorneys who conduct negotiations.
9
The ABA first adopted Rule 4.1 in 1983; it remains the only rule
that explicitly addresses negotiation by attorneys. ' 0 Its sponsors first
proposed a draft that would have obligated "attorney negotiators to be
'fair' and to correct another party's 'manifest misapprehension."
'"1 I
However, Professor James White warned that such a demanding rule
would have been honored only in the breach and so succeeded in scaling
it down to "the lowest level of legally acceptable conduct," whereby
attorneys need only steer clear of fraud.12 To many, then and now, this
dilution betrays at worst a moral weakness in tolerating deception and,
at best a superfluity in providing little more protection than that already
found in the law of fraud. '
3
Indeed, Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton noted in 1989 that Rule
4.1, only a few years into its infancy, did not absolve the legal
community of its glaring need to produce a workable aspirational ethic,
one more robust than the minimum floor Rule 4.1 sets. 14 In the more
than 25 years since Professor Norton's seminal article, there has been
no shortage of proposals to strengthen the MRPC. Many of them exhort,
in one form or another, total candor, a categorical prohibition on
deception, or a general duty of good faith.15
Yet despite the chorus, Rule 4.1 has hardly budged.' 6 The most
recent high-profile movement tasked with amending the MRPC to
9 1d at 120.
" See Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for Process-
Enabling Ethical Codes, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 20 (2005).
" Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 162 (quoting James J. White, Machiavelli
and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
926,937 (1980) (discussing which kinds of lying should be proscribed under the Model
Rules)).
21d. at 162 (citing JESS K. ALBERTS ET AL., HUMAN COMMUNICATION IN SOCIETY
25-31 (2007)).
13 Id. at 107.
14 Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic ofProcess, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493,501 (1989).
"5 See Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of
Defensive Self-Help, 24 O-no ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 481, 520-22 (2009) (categorizing
recent calls for reforming the MRPC).
16 See id at 519 (citing Van M. Pounds, Promoting Truthfulness in Negotiation: A
Mindful Approach, 40
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encourage, if not require, the steady exchange of accurate information
conducive to integrative negotiation was the ABA's Ethics 2000
Commission. It pondered an overhaul of the MRPC with respect to
negotiation, but it ultimately "adopted only a de minimis approach to
deal with ethics... in dispute resolution." 
17
After the Ethics 2000 Commission came up short, Professor Robert
Bordone argued for what he described as a "radical" reform that would
establish a separate MRPC for Lawyers in Negotiation ("MRPCN") to
accommodate negotiation's emergence as a method distinct from
litigation. The MRPCN would be written in the spirit of private ethical
codes for arbitration and mediation, themselves long recognized as
discrete spheres alternative to, rather than subsumed by, traditional
litigation. ' 8 To date, the ABA has not heeded Professor Bordone's
recommendation.
Whatever the source, scale, or nature of various pushes for
modifications of the MRPC, Professor Peter Reilly thinks all of them
are unlikely to improve ethical standards because of inherent
enforcement difficulties even if implemented.19 In his view, aspirational
standards as lofty as "good faith" or "fairness" pose eternally
challenging interpretation problems, while rules as absolute as "no
lying-ever" would essentially require mind-reading, since a party's
true interests and priorities are often not only purely mental but also
dynamic because they shift as a negotiation unfolds. 20 Notably,
Professor Reilly includes Professor Bordone's solution as among those
likely hampered by enforcement problems.
2 1
In this article, I will not insist on what Professor Bordone calls a
"cosmic" sense of "right" and "wrong" to which all lawyers would
surely assent.22 To do so, as Professor Bordone suggested, would only
breed confusion. 23 Nor do I seek to add to the growing backlog of
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 181, 197 (2004)).
17 Bordone, supra note 10, at 37 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Consensus Builder: Ethics for a
New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REv. 63, 85 (2002)).
18 ld At 42.
19 Reilly, supra note 15, at 523.20 Id. at 524.
21 Id
22 Bordone, supra note 10, at 5.
23 Id.
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propositions that the ABA may find easy to embrace in theory but, at
least as reflected in its historical treatment of Rule 4.1, hard to enact or
implement in practice.
Instead, my aim is much more modest: I merely submit an easily
observable and virtually painless addition to negotiations in order to
make arguably amorphous concepts such as good faith and total
disclosure more amenable to effective enforcement.
Quite simply, I posit that videotaping negotiations between
attorneys will both induce more ethical behavior ex ante and facilitate
enforcement ex post. The ABA should mandate that all negotiations
above a certain dollar value be videotaped. These tapes would be subject
to strict nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) binding the attorneys,
conditional on substantial compliance with ethical rules requiring
exchange of accurate information.
My article proceeds as follows. Part II explores why negotiators lie
and reveals that they are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma wherein even
those who recognize that truth-telling is value-maximizing might
engage in deception to protect themselves from exploitation. Hence,
previous proposals such as Professor Bordone's MRPCN may patch up
other problems (the litigation-minded MRPC's unsuitability to
negotiation) but do not do enough to solve this more fundamental one.
Moreover, they overlook a crucial feature that contributes to more
ethical behavior and better enforcement regimes in fields whose
regulatory strategies Professor Bordone hopes negotiation will follow:
the presence of a neutral third-party arbiter.
To address barriers to effective enforcement and to simulate this
third-party observer, I introduce in Part III my proposal to videotape
negotiations as a potential answer. I ground my proposal in
psychological research that has consistently evinced a "social
facilitation effect" whereby an observer's mere presence subtly
influences those under observation to behave more cooperatively. I then
use two negotiation cases carried out by Harvard Law School's (HLS)
Spring 2016 Negotiation Workshop's enrollees to illustrate how an
observing camera's presence or absence might have induced variations
in disclosure. I explain how videotaping's social facilitation makes
negotiators mindful of their reputations and so more cooperative ex
ante. I end Part II by contrasting my proposal with Jamison Davies's
recent suggestion to use derivative contracts and clearinghouses to
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
"formalize reputation markets" as Professors Robert Mnookin and
Ronald Gilson once suggested.24
Part IV next demonstrates that videotaping negotiations can also
bolster currently weak enforcement regimes by making available
evidence usable in ethics proceedings, claims for contractual rescission,
and even tort suits sounding in fraud. I analogize to the use of video
evidence in another context-a recent judicial decision ordering police
officers to wear body cameras-to support my proposal's potential to
improve enforcement. However, I return to social psychology research
to emphasize that videotaping's effects on expost enforcement can only
add to, but operates independently of and thus does not detract from, its
ex ante nudging of negotiators toward integrative problem-solving.
In the final subsection of Part IV, I acknowledge that this single
procedural rule is no panacea, but point out how this argument has failed
to stall progress in the law's attempts to solve other social ills such as
discrimination and securities fraud.
I turn at last to objections in Part V. First, the philosophical:
videotaping seems inherently Orwellian, and unlike the unwitting in
1984,25 negotiators might actively resent cameras' watching them.
However, in invoking Professor Lawrence Lessig's work on social
meaning, I argue that a rule requiring videotaping need not be seen as
implying that negotiators are untrustworthy, and hence, need not
provoke resistance. I draw on cameras in airports and the seemingly
mundane phenomenon of hockey players' wearing of helmets to show
how the ABA can frame ethical rules so that negotiators writ large see
them as Professor Bordone sees them-not as Orwellian constraints on
individual behavior but as facilitators of cooperative environments.26
Then, the practical. Negotiators may see video cameras, if not as
Orwellian surveillance, then at least as a burdensome inconvenience
limiting their choice of settings or modes of communication, such as
phones or email. To lighten the burden, I suggest adding the caveat of a
24 See Jamison Davies, Note, Formalizing Legal Reputation Markets, 16 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 367, 371 (2011). For an overview of legal reputation markets, see
generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509
(1994).
25 See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
26 Bordone, supra note 10, at 9.
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dollar value floor that exempts from the videotaping requirement
negotiations wherein the "amount-in-controversy" falls below that
floor.
Some may worry that the recordings might be disseminated to their
detriment, but I remind them that existing Model Rules affirming each
negotiator's own duty of confidentiality to her client already guard
against unauthorized dissemination. Insofar as this does not completely
calm their concerns, standardized NDAs allowing dissemination only to
tribunals adjudicating meritorious claims of unethical behavior can do
the rest.
Lastly, reformers may doubt whether the ABA will heed my
suggestion. I maintain that my minimalist proposal does not ask the
ABA to move mountains: it at least warrants the ABA's consideration
as a measure to promote its own desire for more cooperation among
attorneys in negotiations and to restore the public's trust in the
profession.
Part VI concludes. There, I identify my proposal's wide
applicability to ethical issues that are emerging in other domains of the
law even as the lines separating those domains collapse.
Finally, I tie it back to Professor Norton's thesis that only a rule of
the game that becomes integrated into the negotiating process itself can
succeed in regulating that same process.
II. WHY Do NEGOTIATORS LIE?
To understand how videotaping negotiations would encourage
parties to negotiate candidly, we must first understand why they might
deceive under the status quo. As is, Rule 4.1 simply implores attorneys
to refrain from outright lying and from omissions of material facts that
would facilitate clients' fraudulent or criminal schemes-how can that
be too much to ask? Remarkably, the reasons attorneys give to explain,
defend, or justify an alleged Rule 4.1 violation are many.
First, many believe that they are economic actors of Milton
Friedman's mold, free to use any tactic as they wish, in pursuit of any
purpose, so long as they stay within "the rules of the game." 2 7 As
27 Richard Shell, Bargaining with the Devil Without Losing Your Soul: Ethics in
Negotiation, in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 57-74 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow
et al. eds., 2004). For an interpretation of Friedman's "rules of the game," see Thomas
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lawyers, they believe that their singular mission is to advocate zealously
for their client's wishes and demands. In a strict sense, this rationale is
supported by the MRPC; Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 does instruct lawyers
to "take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate
a client's cause or endeavor." 28 And "[u]nder generally accepted
conventions in negotiation" Rule 4.1 exempts "certain types of
statements" from the definition of "material fact," thereby permitting
their nondisclosure.
29
Rule 4.1 's sharpest critics contend that its greatest failing is that it
explicitly countenances deception as to matters falling under "certain
types of statements." 30 Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 asserts that statements
regarding reservation prices, parties' willingness to settle, and
undisclosed principals generally do not constitute "material facts" and
hence do not offend Rule 4.1. 3' Although Rule 4.1 suggests that the
three illustrations are not exhaustive, it fails to specify what "type" of
statement qualifies for its exemption. 32 The seemingly unprincipled
manner wherein Rule 4.1 enumerates those 3 items as examples without
a rationale uniting them only invites individual negotiators to persuade
themselves that just about anything warrants the same exemption.33 It
should be no surprise, then, that much confusion and disagreement
ensue about what Rule 4.1 deems a "material fact" or a
"misrepresentation." 34
Furthermore, Rule 4. 1(b) facially subordinates its already limited
duty to disclose to Rule 1.6's general prohibition on disclosure of client
confidences, which leads many well-intentioned attorneys to believe
that attorney-client confidentiality overrides many duties to disclose
without realizing that Rule 1.6(b)(3) already permits disclosures
necessary "to prevent, mitigate, or rectify" substantial injuries flowing
Coleman, Corporate Social Responsibility: Friedman's View, BECKER FRIEDMAN
INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONoMIcS (August 16, 2013),
https://bfi.uchicago.edu/news/feature-story/corporate-social-responsibilty-friedmans-
view.
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2016).
29 Id. at r. 4.1, cmt. 2.
30 Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 107.
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1, cmt. 2 (2016).
32 Norton, supra note 14, at 537.
13 Id. at 538.
3' Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 122.
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from the client's commission of crimes or fraud with assistance of
counsel.35
Rule 4. I's arcane and muddled interactions with other Model Rules
are bad enough in themselves. But they contribute most to
nondisclosures and misrepresentations because they explicitly
envision-and favor-an adversarial ethos whereby an attorney is a
"zealous advocate" whose client's interests are paramount, which in
turn purportedly justifies treating the attorney across the table not
merely as a coparticipant in an adversarial process but also as an
adversary herself.36 Professor Mnookin rejects the zealous advocate
justification for deceptive tricks and other hard bargaining tactics as
"nonsense[, as] Rule 1.3 requires 'reasonable diligence' on behalf of a
client," not blind loyalty.37 But that combative frame of reference has
continued to ignite competitive spirits between lawyers, which is to be
expected because the ABA drafted the MRPC under the paradigm of
litigation, which naturally led to the ossification of the adversarial
ethic.
38
Of course, this is why Professor Bordone proposed the MRPCN: the
ABA designed the MRPC in a past era, for what is essentially a different
game: Litigation.39 Negotiation, as an art unto itself, rewards zealous
advocates too, but zeal as adapted in-context "entails identifying the
[client's] underlying interests... and employing... listening, creativity,
and joint problem-solving to best meet those interests and attain
a[n]... efficient outcome."' 0 This much is not in dispute; academics and
practitioners alike have reached this consensus. Indeed, this belief in
negotiation's utility helps explain negotiation's rise in usage. As early
11 Id. at 156.
36 See ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 292-93 (2000).
3 7 d. at 293.
31 See Brian C. Haussmann, The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations:
Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1218, 1241 (2004)
("ABA formulated its approach to regulating the disclosure of a client's material facts out
of a concern.. .that the adversarial ethic be preserved") (citing AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, The Legislative History of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Delegates (1987)).
31 See Bordone, supra note 10, at 4.
40 id. at 23.
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as 1989, Professor Norton observed that "[i]n effect, litigation is the
alternative to bargaining," not the other way around.4'
Strikingly, though attorneys know full well that joint problem-
solving attains the most efficient outcomes through Full, Open, and
Truthful Exchange (FOTE),42 still many justify Rule 4.1 violations (i.e.,
the exact opposite of FOTE) as a preemptive self-defense tactic against
other attorneys whom they perceive as riddled with ethical violations.
43
In other words, "FOTE is in tension with the Negotiators Dilemma,"
wherein negotiators must "balance how 'full' and 'open' to be, given
how" information can be exploited. 44
Hence, even if an attorney can be persuaded that the MRPC, as the
official "rules of the game," unequivocally forbids deception, their
belief that other attorneys routinely flout the MRPC suggests that the
game is actually played by a different, unspoken set of "rules" more
customary of the Wild West. Put plainly, some attorneys "treat legal
negotiations like prisoners' dilemma games: even if they know
[deception] violates the [MRPC], they may behave unethically simply
just to compete with other lawyers. 45 In this respect, Rule 4.1 produces
effects similar to the MRPC's other provisions. Professor Fred
Zacharias describes the more pervasive consequences of under-
enforcement of the MRPC:
The bar's apparent failure to enforce the rules suggests
that noncompliance is appropriate, either because
nonenforcement implies that the rules are
unenforceable... or because it implies the rules mean
something other than what they seem to say. Moreover,
even if the lawyer accepts that it is wrong to violate the
rules, she may believe that she needs [to violate them] in
4' Norton, supra note 14, at 496.
42 HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS l1 (1996).
4' Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 108.
4 Reilly, supra note 15, at 496.
4' Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 134.
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order to compete with lawyers who breach the code with
impunity.
46
Nor is this just any prisoners' dilemma. As Robert Axelrod
demonstrated in the 1980s, if a small band of cooperators capable of
recognizing and remembering one another as cooperators infiltrates a
larger school of defectors stuck in a prisoners' dilemma, the cooperators
will outperform the defectors, proliferate faster, and eventually redefine
the landscape as largely cooperative instead of overwhelmingly
selfish. 47 But this can take generations. 48 Hence, without external
intervention, cooperative and ethical attorneys may languish as a
persistent minority. In fact, in the twenty years between Larry
Lempert's 1988 survey of attorneys' ethical viewpoints and Professor
Reilly's 2008 redux, members of the legal community apparently have
diverged even further apart in their judgments of what constitutes
ethical and unethical behavior, even though Rule 4. 1's language has
remained largely the same.
49
If even well-meaning attorneys cannot agree on what it means to be
ethical, the slightest dose of cynicism may all but prevent attorneys
attempting to cooperate from recognizing each other as such, thus
perpetuating a collective action problem wherein the legal
community-and clients-would benefit from large-scale cooperation,
but no particular subset of attorneys save for Professor Gerard
Wetlaufer's "saints and fools" would volunteer for the chopping
block. 50 Consequently, lying in negotiation has proved seemingly
intractable.51
" Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising
as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REv. 971,
1005 (2002).
47 See DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Computer Tournaments and
the Evolution of Cooperation, in METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTIONING FOR THE ESSENCE
OF MIND AND PATTERN 715-34 (1985).
48 See id.
4' Reilly, supra note 15, at 519.
50 See Gerard Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1219,
1233 (1990) ("Under
conditions [where we assume the worst of our adversary], only saints and fools can
be relied on to tell the truth.").
51 Reilly, supra note 15, at 482.
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What's more, the empirical evidence of the prevalence and
persistence of lying negotiators-most of whom may sincerely believe
in their own honesty-buttresses Professor Reilly's skepticism that
rewriting the MRPC's language to require "total candor," even if as part
of Professor Bordone's project of carving out the MRPCN afresh, may
not suffice. If the MRPC's baseline expectations ("just don't defraud
anyone") struggle to command uniform comprehension and obeisance,
the story goes, one can hardly expect aspirational (e.g., "FOTE")
regulations stricter in spirit but looser in interpretation to do much
better.
Note that this in no way contradicts Professor Bordone's diagnosis
that the MRPC is outmoded and ill-suited for modem interest-based
negotiation. Yes, a process-specific MRPCN should supplant the
MRPC, whose one size (litigation) quite clearly no longer fits all (most
modes of ADR). 52 No doubt, the MRPCN should be geared toward
"achiev[ing] an outcome that optimize[s] the parties' interests... based
on fair norms and standards[;]... maintaining clear communication[;]
and building trust. 53 But even Professor Mnookin recognized that Rule
4.1, while far from ideal, "is at least somewhat enforceable"; anything
stricter would be "very difficult to enforce."
54
Professor Bordone's MRPCN would mandate that negotiators
undergo training in Mnookin's interest-based negotiation theory and
skills. 55 But the attorneys Hinshaw & Alberts studied in 2011 were
aware of, if not well-versed in, this mode of negotiation, as were the
many attorneys that Professor Wetlaufer canvassed for his 1990
article.56 The problem is less that a stubborn, shrinking contingent stays
willfully ignorant of interest-based negotiation and more that even those
aware that their counterparts are likewise aware of interest-based
negotiation's ascendancy still hesitate to let their guard down,
preferring instead to take their chances with Rule 4.1 because they fear
52 Bordone, supra note 10, at 22.
I d. at 31.
4 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 293-94.
'5 Bordone, supra note 10, at 31.
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their unrequited disclosures would leave them vulnerable in the
Hobbesian anarchy Professor Zacharias described.
5 7
Indeed, before we hold out hope that a stricter insistence on FOTE
would transform the ethical landscape by instilling trust among
formerly suspicious interest-based negotiators if only such an insistence
can gain independence from MRPC's constrictions, a normative shift
toward establishing trust among negotiators must first occur to assure
them that they need not fear the negotiators' dilemma: if they decide to
embrace FOTE, they would not be alone in exposing themselves to
exploitation.
58
Before turning to the merits of my proposal to videotape
negotiations, it's worth pointing out Professor Bordone's own
recognition that because "the MIRPCN would require an extremely high
degree of candidness, honesty, and information sharing..., monitoring
and enforcement will be both more difficult and.. .more important in
order to create a sufficient deterrent effect.",59 Nonetheless, Professor
Bordone maintains that "enforcement is possible" by analogizing to
prosecutors' duty to make available exculpatory evidence to the
defendant and to federal securities laws' mandatory reporting
obligations, both of which tout high compliance rates.
60
Two characteristics may be responsible for both disclosure regimes'
success, which, if lacking in negotiations, may dampen the analogies'
support. First, consider the nature of the items that must be disclosed.
In criminal law, exculpatory evidence is often tangible: witnesses' tales,
forensic data, other suspects' existence, etc. So too with securities law:
for example, the SEC requires companies to report "material events,"
such as a bankruptcy or a change in leadership, as they occur. 61 By
contrast, Professor Reilly reminds us that clients' interests and priorities
often reside solely within their and their lawyers' minds. 62 There will
seldom be a "smoking gun" betraying a violation of disclosure
requirements as blatant as a prosecutor who discards a forensic lab's
7 Zacharias, supra note 46, at 1005.
58 See Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future ofADR: Negotiating Justice and Human
Needs, 18 OHIO. ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 669, 700 (2003).
" Bordone, supra note 10, at 40.
60 Id.
61 The SEC requires prompt disclosure of "current reports" on Form 8-K. 17 C.F.R. §
249.308.
62 Reilly, supra note 15, at 524.
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exculpatory findings or a company that buries its declaration of
bankruptcy in a dusty basement file room.
Second, remember that a neutral third-party arbiter directly
superintends every occasion on which a prosecutor confronts a decision
to turn over exculpatory evidence or on which a company's
management are suddenly replaced. In both cases, an impartial authority
is, in a manner of speaking, "in the room" with, e.g., a company and its
investors or a prosecutor and a defendant.63 That overseer moderates
temptations to deceive and can "turn less-than-truthful inputs into
truthful outputs.
64
Professor Bordone commends mediators and arbitrators for tailoring
their own process-specific ethics to respect and reflect their disciplines'
differences from traditional litigators. 65 The success of separate bodies
of ethics, such as those promulgated by the American Academy of
Family Mediators or the American Arbitration Association, 66 it would
seem to follow, should inspire negotiators to follow suit with the
MRPCN.67 But observe that, as distinct from traditional litigation as
mediation and arbitration might initially seem, they nonetheless share
the crucial feature of a neutral third party presiding over proceedings.
As much as negotiation's emphasis on joint problem-solving and
orientation toward value-creating outcomes may justify its detachment
from the litigation-centric MRPC, still they do not change the fact that
negotiators operate almost exclusively in private, obscure not only from
public view but also neutral supervision.
68
Indeed, negotiation's private nature both defines its essence and
confers its principal advantages over the more cumbersome traditional
litigation model. 69 But it also complicates its amenability to real-time
regulation and ex post enforcement. Put simply, "ethical problems...are
63 See Haussmann, supra note 38, at 1234 ("[An arbiter] makes it possible to entrust
the parties with the presentation of issues, evidence, and arguments and with the challenges
to them.") (citing Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 677 (1978)).
64Id. at 1230.
65 Bordone, supra note 10, at 29.
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id.
68 See Norton, supra note 14, at 498 ("a system of private bargaining of disputes ... is
not exposed to public scrutiny").
69 Id. at 506.
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easier to control [before] a judge than in... unmonitored private"
70settings.
Thus, the two ways wherein disclosure in criminal and securities
law differs from disclosures in negotiations-availability of verifiable
evidence and the presence of a neutral arbiter-may attenuate the extent
to they can serve as templates for an MRPCN to follow. At the same
time, it is for precisely those two reasons that videotaping negotiations
can bridge the dissimilarities and boost compliance.
III. MY PROPOSAL TO VIDEOTAPE NEGOTIATIONS
To begin with, because negotiation at its core is "a private, self-
policed market process, there is no practical way to police ethical
decisions from outside the process" itself.71 Try as the MRPC and ethics
committees tasked with its administration might, it can only be
"invoked after the fact," which compounds difficulties of proving and
punishing its transgressors.
72
In particular, "enforcement of Rule 4.1 is virtually impossible
without assistance from [the negotiating] attorneys" themselves. 73
Although another provision of the MRPC, Rule 8.3, obligates attorneys
to report another attorney's MRPC violations to appropriate
professional authorities, 74 it enlists far less assistance than would be
necessary to give Rule 4.1 its full effect. For one thing, attorneys who
actively participate in a negotiation have a hard time immediately
detecting their counterparts' deception. 75 This is so even among "so-
called 'experts' (such as police investigators), 76 so it's not a matter of
simply training attorneys to be more alert to cues such as gaze aversion
or fidgetiness, for even these "telltale signs" can identify liars only
slightly better than can chance. 77 And if nothing reliably betrays a
70 Id. at 528.
71 Id. at 532.
72 Wetlaufer, supra note 50, at 1235.
73 Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 161.
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N. 2016).
7' Reilly, supra note 15, at 531.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 525 (citing Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should
Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 486-87 (2008)).
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counterpart's bald-faced lies, perhaps one should focus on resolving
Rule 4. I's own enforcement problems before expecting standards like
"total candor" at once both more ambitious but even less visible.
A. Videotaping
To help resolve these enforcement problems, I propose videotaping
negotiations. I harbor no delusion that deceptive negotiators' "tells" will
suddenly become obvious where they would have previously escaped
the naked eye in real-time. If the possibility of replay can aid a
negotiator in learning a counterpart's habits so that she may discern
inconsistencies in the next round of negotiations, 78 then that would just
be a small ancillary benefit.
Rather, the presence of a video-recorder can serve as and replicate
a neutral third-party monitor that currently presides over litigation,
mediation, and arbitration but is lacking in negotiation. By filling that
void, videotaping both encourages honesty during a negotiation itself
and eases subsequent enforcement.
What is it about judges, mediators, and arbitrators that makes their
very presence a check against deceit?79 To be sure, some of it may stem
from their elevated status: attorneys refer to judges with honorifics, and
many arbitrators may be similarly esteemed. Insofar as this status
accounts for their ability to keep the parties appearing before them
honest, it would be farcical to intimate that negotiators owe the same
reverence to an inanimate video-recorder.
Next, much of parties' greater candor before tribunals may lie in an
entirely separate ethical rule: MRPC 3.3 is already aspirational in
specifying that attorneys owe duties of candor and honesty to tribunals,
which is a great deal more than Rule 4.1's baseline prohibition against
fraud .80 But Rule 3.3's higher expectations cannot be the end of the
matter, for that would imply that "candor" and "honesty," as used in
Rule 3.3, are somehow immune from the indeterminacy that hamstrings
their portability into Rule 4.1-governed private negotiations.
78 ld. at 531-32.
79 See Norton, supra note 14, at 497, n.14 ("[Tlhe effect of the entry of an authoritative
monitor is almost surely to reduce opportunities for unethical behavior.").
80 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N. 2016).
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B. "Social Facilitation"
Rather, I posit that much of tribunals' "information-forcing"
81
influence stems from the "social facilitation" effect, a psychological
phenomenon whereby "observer presence or mere social presence
enhances the emission of dominant responses." 82 Dominant responses
are those most commonly found or accepted in a community. 83
Professors Hinshaw & Alberts found that about 30% of attorneys they
surveyed would behave unethically, which represented an
"unacceptably high number."84 Still, they represented a minority: most
of the sample (62%) reported that they would refuse a client's request
to withhold a material fact.85 Even among those who chose the unethical
option, many did so because they were confused as to whether the
hypothetical client's true DONS (a fatal disease communicated through
sexual intercourse) status qualified as a "material fact" or whether their
Rule 1.6 duty of confidentiality overrode their Rule 4.1 disclosure
duty, 86 not because they truly believed that misrepresentation is
acceptable. 87 It is only because of the prevalence of negotiators'
deception that I cannot simply assert honesty as the self-evident
dominant response.
As such, it should be facilitated by the actual presence of an
observer-or even of mere hints of observation. In a study tellingly
titled "Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World
Setting," scholars compared participants' payments to an "honesty box"
for milk and tea in a fridge. 88 In one scenario, an image of a pair of eyes
81 For an exploration of how legal rules may elicit information from private parties,
see Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995).
82 Yuki Miyazaki, Influence of Being Videotaped on the Prevalence Effect During
Visual Search, 6 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 583 (2015).
83 See Robert B. Zajonc & Stephen M. Sales, Social Facilitation of Dominant and
Subordinate Reponses, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 160, 161 (1966).




88 Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real
World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 412-14 (2006); e.g., Redouan Bshary & Nichola
J. Raihani, Toward an Experimental Exploration of the Complexity of Human Social
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overlooks the fridge. In another, a flower replaced the eyes. The fridge
also featured a list of "suggested" prices. As social facilitation theory
would have predicted, participants "paid nearly three times as much" of
their own money in the eyes scenario than in the flower one.89 The
authors attribute this pattern to the eyes' inducement of a perception of
being watched, which, they suggest, has practical implications "for
those designing honesty-based systems." 90 Another study found that
when its participants felt subject to surveillance cues, they "affirm[ed]
their prevailing moral norms by expressing greater disapproval of moral
transgressions" such as lying. 91 And subsequent studies have used the
same contrast between images of flowers and eyes to replicate the
findings of the study above, both cross-culturally 92 and as applied to real
life littering and recycling.
93
To make this point more vivid you may remember the billboard
image of Dr. T. J. Eckleburg that overlooked Long Island in F. Scott
Fitzgerald's 1925 novel The Great Gatsby.94 In that novel, the billboard
exclusively featured Dr. Eckleburg's eyes with spectacles. The
characters pass by that billboard several times, each time barely noticing
it despite its conspicuousness. When they did notice it, it would remind
them of moral considerations that had previously eluded them.95 This
Interactions, 108.45 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 18195, 18196 (2011) (Summarizing
psychological studies, including Bateson et al.'s, indicating that "individuals are more
helpful if they perceive cues that they are being watched.").
89 Bateson et al., supra note 88, at 413.
90 Id.
91 p. Bourat et al., Surveillance Cues Enhance Moral Condemnation, 9(2) EVOL.
PSYCHOL. 193-99 (May 5, 2011).
92 See, e.g., R. Oda et al., An Eye-like Painting Enhances the Expectation of a Good
Reputation, 32 EVOL. HUM. BEHA. 166-71 (2011).
9' See D. Francey & R. Bergmuller, Images of Eyes Enhance Investments in a Real-
Life Public Good, 7(5) PLOS ONE (2012),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22624026; accord Melissa Bateson et al., Watching
Eyes on Potential Litter Can Reduce Littering: Evidence from Two Field Experiments,
PEER J. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26644979.
94 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 23 (1925) ("But above the grey land
and the spasms of bleak dust which drift endlessly over it, you perceive, after a moment,
the eyes of Doctor T. J. Eckleburg") (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 167 ("'God knows what you've been doing, everything you've been doing.
You may fool me but you can't fool God!'.. .Michaelis saw with a shock that [Wilson] was
looking at the eyes of Doctor T. J. Eckleburg which had just emerged pale and enormous
from the dissolving night. 'God sees everything,' repeated Wilson.").
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may have been an early instance of what Professors Max Bazerman and
Ann Tenbrunsel call "ethical fading," whereby decisionmakers tend to
overvalue future, imagined outcomes to the exclusion of ethical
factors.96 Both the billboard of Dr. Eckleburg's eyes and the printout of
nondescript eyes in psychological studies served to make viewers more
cognizant of "the right thing to do."
And if a 2D printout of eyes can have this effect, then so too should
a video-recorder. Indeed, "[v]ideo cameras have traditionally been used
to manipulate observer presence," the effects of which video-
monitoring mimics.
97
C. As Seen in the Spring 2016 Negotiation Workshop (Jqbal's Big
Venture & DONS)
That is the social psychology research. Negotiation has
consequently come to incorporate descriptive empirical results into its
pedagogy. 98 Take, as an illustrative example, HLS's Spring 2016
rendition of its Negotiation Workshop. During one week, its enrollees
(of whom I was one) conducted a videotaped negotiation titled "Iqbal's
Big Venture" 99 and later reviewed their recordings with faculty.
Students' negotiations were taped for educational purposes.
Presumably, no student entertained that his video could make unwanted
appearances in ethics proceedings or tort suits alleging fraud. In any
case, students were informed that their pairwise negotiations would be
taped to allow them to observe the messages and cues each partner had
intended to convey to, or in fact received from, the other;100 whether
96 Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, HARV. Bus. REV.
(April 2011), https://hbr.org/201 1/04/ethical-breakdowns.
9 Miyazaki, supra note 82.
98 Bordone, supra note 10, at 16 (citing Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of
ADR: Negotiating Justice and
Human Needs, 18 OHiO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 693 (2003)).
" Robert C. Bordone & Tobias C. Berkman, "lqbal's Big Venture" (May 2012),
http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/iqbals-big-venture/.
100 NEGOTIATION WORKSHOP, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, THE WORKBOOK 62 (Spring
2016) ("The video review enables you to observe yourself negotiating, to learn your
partner's perspectives on and reactions to the negotiation, and to observe another pair of
negotiators working on the same exercise.").
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they had to negotiate ethically was not explicitly mentioned as part of
the lesson plan.
10'
Nonetheless, many students, told in advance that their videos would
be critiqued not only by their instructors but also by their peers,
displayed an inclination to conduct "Iqbal's Big Venture"
cooperatively. Of course, one can never eliminate as a potential
motivator (nor, it seems, underestimate) the desire to "look good for the
camera." 10 2 Whatever else that may imply, at the very least it meant that
students wanted to be on their best behavior, which precludes "bluffimg
and puffing...and...the intentional use of deceptive hard-bargaining
tactics."'
' 03
Instructors uploaded each pair's video to the course's website,
where students can watch their own videos and their classmates'. For
this piece, I returned to the course's website to watch the recordings of
the 12 pairs of classmates who formed the subsection of the Spring 2016
Negotiation Workshop to which I belonged. Though I actively exercised
the vigilance Professor Reilly recommends as a self-defense measure in
order to spot indications of deception-such as unprepared,
unconvincing, or defensive answers to probing inquiries 104-I
identified scarcely any instances of bad behavior or signs of bad
motives.
Of course, this alone does not definitively prove much. As I
mentioned above, even so-called experts of lie detection are
overconfident "but not more accurate[] in their determinations of who
is lying and who is not,"' 05 and I am surely no expert. But you need not
trust my account: after negotiating "Iqbal's Big Venture," my
subsection drew and publicly displayed charts summarizing the options
they ultimately decided on in reaching an agreement. The numerosity
of the options the class collectively produced suggests that the students
had engaged in "mutual information exchange, [which] enables parties
101 See id.
102 See John R. Aiello & Kathryn J. Kolb, Electronic Performance Monitoring and
Social Context: Impact on Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339-53 (June
1995).
103 Bordone, supra note 10, at 31.
1O4 Reilly, supra note 15, at 500 ("Because [the negotiator] was lying.. .she may not
have prepared an answer for [an opponent's].. .simply asking 'why?'.. .repeatedly and in
different ways.").
105/d. at 531 (emphasis added).
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to identify value-creating trades, areas in which they can exploit
differences between them to enlarge the size of the overall pie."1
0 6
Indeed, the subsection's variety of a dozen or so agreements' was
probably limited only by time and imagination, not by deception or
refusals to cooperate.
Interestingly enough, the Spring 2016 run of the Negotiation
Workshop videotaped only "Iqbal's Big Venture," which did not
explicitly implicate the ethics of disclosure, but did not videotape "The
DONS Negotiation," the sole negotiation specifically designed to
expose students to ethical challenges concerning disclosure. While
debriefing "The DONS Negotiation," the most noteworthy variations
that emerged consisted in negotiators' decisions to disclose (or not) and
their rationales for their decisions.
Coincidentally, Hinshaw and Alberts's study adapted the very same
"DONS Negotiation" to measure attorneys' ethical tendencies and their
attitudes on disclosure) 0 7 Briefly, "The DONS Negotiation places the
attorney in the moments before settlement negotiations[, when] the
client reveals a critical new fact[:].. .his two earlier DONS tests [were]
false positives[, so] he does not have the [DONS] disease after all."' '
Nevertheless, the client requests that his attorney withhold this new fact
in order to punish his former girlfriend, 10 9 whom he had led to believe
that his two previous positive DONS tests accurately indicated that he
was afflicted with the disease."Il
0
In this scenario, Rule 4.1 would deem "the client's actual DONS
status... clearly material... because the entire settlement negotiation is
premised on the client's statement that he had contracted the DONS
virus."1 And yet, of the attorneys surveyed, "only one-half.. .properly
applied Rule 4.1," 112 a proportion that Hinshaw and Alberts found
"alarming" and "worrisome." 13
106 Bordone, supra note 10, at 18.
107 See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 11 6.
108 Id.
109 Id.
.. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
112 1d. at 120.
113 Id.
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One hopes-but I expect-that students and attorneys would have
hewn closer to Rule 4. l's spirit under videotaped conditions, much as
"Iqbal's Big Venture" had been.
A cautionary warning: of course, my comparison of "Iqbal's Big
Venture" and "DONS" in this section has been far from scientific. For
one thing, they are two distinct negotiation cases, which means that I
cannot treat one as if it were the other's control group because the
variable to manipulate here, while holding all else constant, is not what
case students enacted, but whether they were 1) videotaped or 2) not
videotaped.
The most I can say at present is that the contrasting observations I
gathered from the two cases, separate as they are, is at least consistent
with what social facilitation theory would predict: that an observer (or
a video-camera) would encourage cooperation and discourage
deceptive practices (e.g., material omissions).
In the future, it would be interesting to sort a future cohort of
Negotiation Workshop enrollees into either an experimental group or a
control group, have both groups enact the same case (e.g., assign both
groups "DONS" only), and videotape the experimental group, but not
the control group. That would provide sturdier empirical support to
supplement my non-experimental examination of my Spring 2016
Negotiation Workshop classmates, which largely coheres with
Professors Hinshaw and Alberts's survey of practitioners. 1
14
D. Social Facilitation Operates on Reputation
Still, a video recorder cannot make corporeal what is purely mental:
interests and priorities. 115 But as the 2D eyeball printout study
114 Note, however, ethical attitudes and practices may differ between students as one
group and practitioners as another. For example, a survey of first-year students at
Georgetown University Law Center, none of whom had taken a course on professional
ethics, found that first-year students were more willing than practitioners to risk unethical
behavior in pursuit of zealous advocacy. See Andrew Hogan, The Naive Negotiator: An
Empirical Study of First-Year Law School Students' Truth-telling Ethics, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 725, 739 (2013). The study's author hypothesized that students' greater willingness
might be attributable to practitioners' having benefited from courses on professional ethics,
or to practitioners' "better understand[ing] the reputational risk of unethical behavior." Id.
(emphasis added).
115 Reilly, supra note 15, at 524.
346
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demonstrated, social facilitation does not require that uncooperative
actions be directly observable-only that the actor think he is being
observed. If a participant in that study had taken tea and milk from the
fridge without paying into the honesty box, no one could have traced
that grand larceny back to him. There were no cameras, no humans
around, no payer-specific markers on the currency deposited into the
honesty box. Yet the gentle sensation that someone is "in the room" with
the participants effectively tripled their payments.
Likewise, videotaping negotiations can socially facilitate
cooperative behavior, including honest disclosure and joint problem-
solving. The means whereby it accomplishes this is no mystery: signals
of monitoring raise reputational concerns and "the possible threat of
punishment,"' 1 6 the combination of which "leads to the preference of
socially desirable cooperative strategies." '117 Few signals are less subtle
than a video recorder.
Viewed another way, a video camera would make a negotiator's
reputation-and fear of punishment, whether in the form of bruised
reputations or otherwise, which I will address in Part IV-more salient
in anticipation of, during, and upon reflection on his taped negotiations.
And of course, the possibility that one's negotiating counterpart may
replay the tape or, worse yet, admit it into evidence in an enforcement
proceeding would make any negotiator contemplating deception think
twice. Therefore, a video recorder can make negotiators behave as if
their reputations are on the line in Professors' Mnookin and Gilson's
reputation market in each taped negotiation. 118 In game theory's
parlance, simply videotaping negotiations can bring the shadow of the
future to the forefront of negotiators' consciousness.' 19 Memorializing
negotiators' cooperation and the accompanying integrative reputations
thereby engendered should drastically hasten cooperative negotiators'
banding together, their runaway propagation among negotiators, and the
community's wholesale transformation from a deadlocked prisoners'
116 Jan Kratky et al., It Depends on Who is Watching You: 3-D Agent Cues Increase
Fairness, PLOS ONE, Feb. 9, 2016, at 1,
http://www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov/pmc/articIes/PMC4747577/ (citing Max Ernest-Jones et
al., Effects of Eye Images on Everyday Cooperative Behavior: A Field Experiment, 32J.
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 172, 172-78 (2011).
117 Id.
18 Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 24, at 514.
"
9 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 126-30 (1984).
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dilemma into an environment more conducive to value-creating and
problem-solving solutions. 120
E. Comparison to Jamison Davies' Formalizing Reputation Markets
Admittedly, merely placing a video recorder in the negotiation room
may lack Jamison Davies's ingenuity of formalizing Mnookin and
Gilson's theoretical reputation market through derivative contracts or a
centralized ratings clearinghouse. 121 But videotaping negotiations
offers several advantages to Mr. Davies's two innovations.
First, videotaping's effectiveness in encouraging cooperative
behavior lies primarily in its simplicity. As Mr. Davies shrewdly
observes, "[d]erivative contracts may present some
difficulties... [because] lawyers must structure [them].. .to overcome
countervailing incentives to behave in a non-cooperative fashion." 122
How might a lawyer do this? Mr. Davies's two suggestions are for "a
neutral party [to] publish a list of all the [derivative] contracts and their
statuses" and for lawyers to "open the derivatives to a secondary
market." 123 Note, however, that both solutions presuppose that a
functioning, well-drafted derivative contract already exists; they do not
address how to draft these derivative contracts in the first place to
"override incentives to behave in a non-cooperative fashion." 124 Unless
negotiating attorneys can devise standard-form contracts based on (i.e.,
deriving from) attorneys' reputations, determining what shape such
contracts should take and what contents they should hold may prove to
be a costly endeavor only specialists can undertake, beyond the
expertise of the negotiating attorneys themselves. Even if such
derivative contracts successfully come into being, their enforceability
still hinges on several "attendant risks and downsides."' 125 When the
task at hand is to enforce Rule 4.1, the solution should not spawn its
own questions of enforceability.
120 See id.
121 Davies, supra note 24, at 379.
122 Id. at 376.
123 Id. at 376-77.
124 Id. at 376.
125 Id. at 377.
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In contrast, a video camera is, in the first instance, easy to just plug-
and-play: no derivative experts required. Better yet, the recording it
would produce is self-enforcing-it would quite literally speak for itself
if entered as evidence in an enforcement proceeding.
Second, Mr. Davies foresees that a clearinghouse's "initial
implementation would be [a] major obstacle." 126 It would be
"dependent on a large number of users providing a large amount of
feedback," which would demand time and effort that "[f]aw firms and
clients might be reluctant to spend." 127 And, as with all things,
"someone has to pay for" it.128 Here too, a video camera's plug-and-
play nature minimize implementation costs by supplying its own
information, the very information Davies and Professors Gilson and
Mnookin rightly consider so invaluable.
In sum, Mr. Davies's creative proposals suggest an impressive
familiarity with the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) (or its impetus and
consequences if not the legislation itself), which called for greater
regulation of and transparency in derivatives and for a central
clearinghouse. 129 To be sure, I do not suggest that Mr. Davies modeled
his methods of formalizing legal reputation markets on the DFA. But
shying away from the DFA model of regulation is precisely my point:
its formidable (if praiseworthy) attempt to regulate complex and risky
financial technologies has predictably resulted in confusion and delay
surrounding its implementation.13
0
Endeavors to make attorneys more attuned to the effects that their
ethical decisions can have on their reputations as either wellsprings or
Scrooges of accurate information does not need solutions that introduce
their own complications. Instead, keeping it simple with my suggestion
of videotaping may suffice to keep attorneys honest with each other.
126 Id. at 381.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3 o See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:
Case Studies andImplications, 124 YALE L.J. 882,912 (2015) ("[T]hese decisions have
clouded implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, contributing significantly to the
rulemaking delays under that law.").
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IV. VIDEOTAPING'S EFFECTS ON ENFORCEMENT
Now, I could not promise that this one move will be the silver bullet
that completely does away with all deception. Indeed, as with many
challenges in negotiation, they cannot be eliminated-only managed. 131
Even with an ABA rule mandating that negotiations be videotaped, "[a]
comfortable and well prepared liar" 132 can still figure out how to coexist
with the camera in the room, especially since many deceptive acts are
imperceptible. 133 But such a rule should do much to reduce incentives,
temptations, and opportunities to lie during negotiations.
Insofar as such ex ante reductions can only be inevitably
incomplete, the need for a robust enforcement regime remains.
Unfortunately, punishing deception in negotiations "is and always has
been a major challenge."'
134
The central obstacle, Professor Norton reminds us, is that
negotiation, as a "private [and] self-policed market process,"'135 proves
impervious to most regulation from outside that process. 136 In light of
this obstacle, videotaping negotiations can emerge as a prime candidate
to regulate from within the process. Quite literally, it would become part
of the negotiating process itself: installing and turning on the video
camera is Step One in that process.
But videotaping does more than merely fit-and thereby
surmount-Professor Norton's description of the form any successful
regulation must take. Indeed, just as a video camera can caution
negotiators to behave cooperatively as the 2D image of watchful eyes
had done, its recordings can serve evidentiary purposes by facilitating
post hoc claims of a negotiator's deceit. In so doing, the camera would
help break negotiators out of the prisoners' dilemma-that they
wouldn't be a "fool" to exchange information fully, openly, and
truthfully.
131 Cf Robert Adler et al., Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger,
14 NEGOT. J. 161, 177-79 (1998) (advising that, in dealing with their emotions, negotiators
can become more self-aware and exercise more self-control, but cannot eliminate them
completely).
132 Reilly, supra note 15, at 500.
133 Id.
134 Bordone, supra note 10, at 39.
133 Norton, supra note 14, 532.
136 Id.
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Some misrepresentations go unpunished because their victims do
not detect them. Others because, though detected, their victims forgo
seeking relief because they anticipate problems of proof. The alleged
liar might raise any number of familiar defenses and excuses: "what
lie?"; "it never happened"; "you misunderstood"; "you're taking it out
of context," and so on.
These defenses lose much of their force if existing video evidence
contradicts or belies them. Take the "you're taking it out of context"
defense. True enough, context is vital to determining a statement's
intent and import. Statements in written transcript form (e.g.,
depositions) are bereft of cues no scribe can capture: meaning varies
(or, at least, can be argued to be at variance with one's opponent's
"misinterpretation") with things like intonation, emphasis,
accompanying body language (imagine a wink), and much more.
Video evidence can restore those cues. Even if a video does not
definitively establish one meaning as better than another, it would still
allow a factfinder to determine for herself what the video shows instead
of relying on disputants' dueling recollections, characterizations, or
reenactments. If part of the explanation for honesty in mediation,
arbitration, and litigation lies in a neutral arbiter's presence (if not an
arbitrator's) and her concomitant power to assess the parties in real
time, then videotaping negotiations can enable a subsequent neutral
arbiter to assess negotiators' behavior as if she had been present with
them in real-time.
A. Analogy to NYPD Body Cameras
Video evidence's utility is nothing new in some of the law's other
domains. Consider recent calls for law enforcement officials to wear
"body cameras" to enable subsequent arbiters-whether a judge, a
civilian complaint board, or an internal affairs bureau-to decide for
themselves what their eyes tell them. 137 In Floyd v. City of New York, to
mention just one prominent case, Judge Shira Scheindlin ordered the
New York Police Department (NYPD) "to institute a pilot project in
which body-worn cameras will be worn for a one-year period by officers
137 See generally Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras:
Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 395 (2016).
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on patrol in one precinct per borough."' 138 In justifying her order, Judge
Scheindlin claimed that "[v]ideo recordings will serve a variety of
useful functions." 139 Most directly, "they will provide a
contemporaneous, objective record of stops and frisks, allowing for the
review of officer conduct by supervisors and the courts." 140 Video
recordings would thus represent a vast improvement over the sole
contemporaneous records previously submitted as evidence: written
police forms and "short memo book entries," which were sometimes
prepared only after significant delay and hence not truly
"contemporaneous," and were often-if not "inherently"-one-
sided.
141
The same benefits would flow from porting video recordings and
evidence into the negotiation context. If adopted, my proposal would
ease problems of proof-ranging from inherent bias to sheer
unavailability-in enforcing rules against misrepresentation, deceit,
and fraud in negotiations. Moreover, bar associations' ethics
committees are not the only arbiters, nor ethics proceedings the only
avenue of relief, that this new availability of evidence would help.
Judges and juries would be better equipped to evaluate aggrieved
parties' requests for contractual rescission for misrepresentation as
authorized by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §164,142 or even
for remedies from a professional attorney's tortious misrepresentation
to a third party under the Restatement (Second) of Torts §552, which
some courts have used to allow non-clients (e.g., the aggrieved party
from the other side of the negotiating table) to recover from lawyers. 143
Easing misrepresentations of victims' access to judicial safeguards
and remedies will in turn discourage negotiators from making such




142 See, e.g., Ati. Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 718 (4th Cir.
1983) (awarding relief from a contract that violated a state's Unfair Trade Practice Act,
which the court described as overlapping with §164).
141 See, e.g., McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffier v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991
S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1999) (holding a lender's law firm liable for misrepresentations
made to borrowers); see generally E. Cliff Martin & T. Karena Dees, The Truth About
Truthfulness: The Proposed Commentary to Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 777-90 (2002).
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misrepresentations in the first place, creating a positive feedback loop
that will further apply downward pressure on the incidence of
negotiators' deceit. This too has long been recognized and relied upon
in other legal domains: Judge Scheindlin predicted that her order
requiring the NYPD to wear body cameras "will encourage lawful and
respectful interactions on the part of both parties."'144 Ultimately, Judge
Scheindlin hopes that body cameras will "alleviate some of the mistrust
that has developed between the police and... [the] communities" they
serve. 145 Videotaping negotiations should likewise alleviate---or, better
yet, forestall-mistrust of one's negotiating counterparty, and vice
versa.
B. Social Facilitation Exerts Two Related But Independent Effects: Ex
Ante & Ex Post
It is important to note, however, that video recordings' potential to
reduce negotiators' uncooperative behavior ex ante can be supplemented by,
but is independent of, the promise of effective ex post enforcement. That is,
the very presence of a video recorder has a "truth-forcing" effect, even if the
recording is never later presented to a tribunal for evaluation in
contemplation of possible punishment. Recall that that image could not have
served any evidentiary purpose: it could neither record anything nor report
to any enforcers. Despite the 2D image's total inability (unlike, e.g., a video
camera that was merely ambiguous as to whether it was turned on and
functional), it still brought the best out of--or socially facilitated-
participants. More broadly speaking, while early psychology researchers had
thought that only observers who can evaluate performance can raise it,146 a
meta-analysis of more than 200 studies concluded that "social facilitation
effects are surprisingly unrelated to the performer's evaluation
apprehension."
' 147
Put differently, the social facilitation effect represents a phenomenon
that adds to, but does not depend on, the more obvious intuition that
punishing proscribed behavior will deter it. To the extent that strict,
publicized enforcement of the kind Professor Bordone espouses can enter a




146 N. Cottrell, "Social Facilitation," in C. McClintock (ed.), EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (New York: Holt, 1972).
147 See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Linda J. Titus, Social Facilitation: A Meta-Analysis of
241 Studies, 94 AM. PSYCHOL. BULL. 265, 265 (1983).
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negotiator's calculus at his moments of temptation, 4 ' this is all for the better.
Indeed, just as replaying videotapes can help a negotiator learn a
counterparty's tells, that counterparty's greater awareness of the possibility
of replay can counteract ethical fading.'49
But even a negotiator who does not anticipate that a neutral arbiter will
later view his videotaped session to assess the validity of an allegation of
deceit will still be nudged toward more cooperative behavior by the mere
presence of the video camera as an observer.
Consequently, this decoupling of a video camera's ex ante subtle influence
from its later use in expost ethical orjudicial proceedings allows my proposal
to withstand claims of imperfection: it cannot fully eliminate enforcement
regimes' shortcomings rooted in the invisibility of negotiators' purely internal
thoughts (e.g., interests, priorities, etc.). But this criticism pervades proof of
mental states in wide swaths of the law: for example, even if a real estate
transaction wherein a homeowner politely (or even rudely) turns away a buyer
were caught on camera, it would still hardly show that the homeowner
intentionally discriminated against the buyer because membership in a
protected class as a legal concept or the homeowner's prejudice as a matter of
fact. It's no secret that "[i]ntentional discrimination is so difficult to
prove... because the evidence that exists [is] chiefly circumstantial in
nature....""' Simply put, society finds it hard to envision, and courts remain
reluctant to be convinced, that intentional discrimination exists "[a]bsent the
smoking gun.' 51
C. This Won't Solve Everything... But ft's Still a Worthwhile Proposal
But this longstanding difficulty of proof is no reason to abstain from
adopting evidentiary modifications that, far from pretending that no such
difficulty exists, attempt to make it easier to arrive at a regulatory scheme's
desired end. In housing discrimination law, for example, courts have crafted,
and Congress has accepted, disparate impact as an alternative theory
perceived as "easier for plaintiffs to satisfy."'52 Because "a 'smoking gun'
4' See Bordone, supra note 10, at 31.
149 Bazerman & Tenbrusel, supra note 96.
150 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv.
701, 768 (2006).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 769; see also Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2015) (confirming that the Fair Housing Act (FHA)
includes disparate impact liability, characterizing Congress as having ratified its inclusion,
and analogizing to the Court's endorsement of disparate impact liability in employment
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often is not available to prove.. .discriminatory intent[,J... the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green set forth a three-step burden-shifting
evidentiary model by which plaintiffs can prove cases through circumstantial
evidence." '153 Even in securities law, which Professor Bordone cited as a field
whose regulations enjoy high compliance, 154 class action suits alleging
securities fraud confronted a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to class
certification until the Supreme Court incorporated academic research in
Basic v. Levinson to find "a practical resolution to the problem of showing
individual reliance."' 55 In all cases, the Court addressed vexing difficulties
of proof by inventing or modifying procedural rules to increase a preexisting
enforcement regime's effectiveness (e.g., Title VII's).
Have such innovations decisively removed all barriers to enforcement or
completely eliminated the underlying ills? No. Much remains to be done to
address housing and employment discrimination, securities fraud, and other
stubborn wrongs. 1 6 The tools discussed above, and others like them, have
greatly contributed to the progress made thus far, 157 even as the legal
community has continued to debate their efficacy and potential flaws.'58 But
the point is that an inability to prove, at the moment of proposal, that a
proposed procedural innovation will cure all diseases in one fell swoop cannot
justify discarding it before it even gets a chance.
The same holds true of my proposal to videotape negotiations. Early on, I
disclaimed any pretension that I've stumbled upon the single move that will
solve the pervasive, intractable problem of deception in negotiations. Instead,
I called it a modest suggestion whose benefits may become apparent only
incrementally, by way of a positive feedback loop between the twin effects of
law in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Congress's subsequent codification) (internal
citations omitted).
153 Angela K. Herring, Untangling the Twombly-McDonnell Knot: The Substantive
Impact of Procedural Rules in Title VII Cases, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1083, 1088 (2011).
154 Bordone, supra note 10, at 40.
155 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1990) (citing
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
156 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment) ("Today we enjoy
a society that is remarkable in its openness and opportunity. Yet our tradition is to go
beyond present achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws
and injustices that remain.").
157 See, e.g., Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (acknowledging the
need, and the FHA's "continuing role[,] in moving the Nation toward a more integrated
society.").
158 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 155 (questioning Basic's economic
soundness).
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ex ante social facilitation and expost strengthened enforcement.
V. OBJECTIONS
A. Philosophical
My calling it "modest" does not mean, of course, that negotiators under a
camera's gaze will agree. Indeed, I argued that a video camera can socially
facilitate cooperative negotiation based on the simple premise that "if a 2D
image of eyes can do it, so can a video camera."
1. Reactance Theory
Butjust as this lack of subtlety can support extending the social facilitation
effect from social psychology to best practices in negotiation, negotiators can
also perceive its "in-your-face-ness" as disquietingly Orwellian. If negotiators
see videotaping as surveillance, then they may try to thwart it as predicted by
either "reactance theory," or, more fittingly, what Professor Lessig calls the
"Orwell effect."
159
Before addressing this objection, I should underscore just how serious it
is. I may have categorized it as "philosophical" for a neat heading, but it is
probably better characterized as an objection "as a matter of principle," as it
draws on sociological and psychological phenomena, much as Professor
Lessig's article The Regulation of Social Meaning did in coining the "Orwell
effect.5
160
Reactance theory has observed that "surveillance may undermine.. .the
very behaviors.. .monitoring is intended to ensure." 161 How? Because
reactance theory also holds that people (understandably) dislike measures
perceived to restrict their freedom and will resist such measures in order to
reassert their freedom. 162 To take an example all too familiar, Professor Cass
Sunstein discussed teenagers who frustrate governmental programs that aim
to reduce smoking and substance abuse, by smoking and abusing substances.
"9 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHL. L. REv. 943, 1017
(1995).
.60 See id As far as I know, that article was the first to speak of an "Orwell effect," at
least as it relates to legal attempts to influence actions' social meaning. Professor Lessig
did not cite another source for that phrase.
161 LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 128 (2012) (citing
Michael. E. Enzle and Sharon. C. Anderson, Surveillant Intentions and Intrinsic
Motivation, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 257-66 (1993)).
162 Id
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The government's well-intentioned condemnation somehow perversely
glamorizes a teenager who dares to perform such acts of rebellion by appearing
cool to his peers, a tiny subcommunity wherein conformity means defying "the
government's" (scientifically correct) campaigns.'
63
Nor are such acts of rebellion limited to juvenile teenagers. Professor
Elizabeth Joh observes that while the "police tend to think that those who
evade surveillance are criminals, [such] evasion may only be a protest against
the surveillance itself.' 164 For instance, they may use online encryption or
disposable phones not to conceal any criminal acts but to express their
"ideological belief or personal conviction" against police surveillance. 165
Thus, citizens who engage in what Professor Joh terms "privacy protests" seek
to convey expressions of distrust and disapprobation to their government,
which they perceive as overreaching.
166
What's more, even in the police context, resistance to surveillance can run
in the other direction: frustration may brew among the police officers
themselves if they suddenly become subject to surveillance too. Recall Judge
Scheindlin's decision in Floyd. There, she issued her order decreeing that
officers wear body-cameras because mutual distrust had developed between
officers on the one hand and the communities they serve on the other. 167 It can
be no surprise, then, when police departments embrace policies requiring them
to wear body cameras only begrudgingly.' 61 One need not sympathize with the
Department as an institution to give an individual officer the benefit of the
doubt that her abhorrence of such an imposition does not arise from a desire
for impunity. Nor need one blindly trust this individual officer to surmise that
she would interpret Judge Scheindlin's order as carrying a distinctively critical
social meaning: that she, who might sincerely think of herself as a brand apart
from the bad apples, nonetheless does not deserve trust. Judge Scheindlin's
explicit citation of the restoration of trust as ajustification for her decree only
163 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
906-18 (1996) (listing smoking's many harms and describing how teenagers "who reject
generally held norms may be the most committed of conformists; they are following the
norms of a subcommunity, [which] violates generally held norms but imposes a rigid
orthodoxy on the subgroup").
164 Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment
Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 997, 998 (2013).
165 Id. at 1000.
166 Id. at 1006.
167 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
168 See J. David Goodman, New York Police Should Revise Body Camera Rules,
Report Says, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2015 ("Cameras should not become another vehicle to
make the job of policing any more difficult.").
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
confirms this.' 69 Despite times when the monitor offers good reasons for why
monitoring is necessary, it is plain how the particular reasons given can breed
resentment in the monitored.
Thus, my proposal must respond to reactance theory's proposition that
those under surveillance will resist and attempt to thwart video cameras from
fulfilling their purpose. The more pushback attorneys give, the less utility
video cameras provide. 170 Hence, I should allay their concerns about
overreaching surveillance in order for my proposal to function as a net
positive. It would be self-defeating if, as a form ofprotest, attorneys were to
become even more tight lipped, not deceiving but not freely exchanging
information either.
That point of emphasis is crucial. Note precisely what reactance theory
holds. It does not hold that attorneys under surveillance would become more
silent out of a fear of running afoul of Rule 4.1 on camera. That would simply
indicate that the camera over-deters deception by chilling legitimate
disclosures too. Obviously, that would not be ideal for attorneys or clients
seeking negotiated solutions based on FOTE. But whether implementing a
camera would overcorrect is an empirical matter, to be resolved if and when
it arises. Here, it suffices to observe that over-deterrence and chilling effects
are not reactance theory problems.
Rather, for reactance theory to present a true objection, an attorney must
actively rebel. That is, not only does his conduct happen to violate a rule, but
he intentionally does so because there's a rule proscribing it.
First, consider what that rebellion might look like. You might be
imagining an attorney who would intentionally engage in uncooperative
behavior. He might misrepresent a material fact. Sideline for the moment that
doing so would expose him to ethical sanctions and other penalties discussed
above. Here, simply note that that act of protest would be protesting Rule 4.1 's
substantive prohibitions on deceptions themselves, and not my rule mandating
cameras, which is merely procedural.
Consider the following parallel to Professor Joh's account of privacy
protests. Her conception of a privacy protestor is someone who tries to thwart
police surveillance by, e.g., buying a burner phone, but would not have
See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
170 Cf Shari S. Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1865 (2001) ("A motivation-based explanation, based on
reactance theory, is thatjurors see the admonition as an attempt to restrict their freedom to
weigh and evaluate probative evidence in reaching their verdict. Responding to this threat
to their freedom, jurors may not only be motivated to ignore the instruction to disregard
the inadmissible evidence but may even focus more attention on the evidence they were
instructed to ignore.").
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committed substantive crimes, with or without the burner phone. In that case,
it seems clear that someone who buys a burner phone is protesting the police's
surveillance of phones in general and not the criminalization of any acts, since
the protestor is, by Professor Joh's definition, content with refraining from
committing crimes. 7 '
So too here. If the form of my proposed ABA rule is "No negotiation
[satisfying certain conditions, such as dollar floors] can take place between
two attorneys unless there's a camera in the room" such that turning a camera
on is Step I to the negotiation, then a protest of that rule can only occur at that
moment-i.e., the attorney would have to refuse the camera's placement.
That would be like asking an arbitrator to leave the room of an arbitration.
An arbitrator's presence is mandatory; without her, it would no longer be an
arbitration. I trust that even the most stubborn attorney would agree that it
would be profoundly bizarre to ask of an arbitrator "what are you doing here,
at this arbitration?"
But then the stubborn attorney might retort "an arbitrator's presence at an
arbitration is distinguishable from a camera's presence in a negotiation-
there's just something creepy about a camera watching me." This retort tries
to attach an Orwellian meaning to the camera, which in fairness is natural and
understandable. After all, what is surveillance if not Orwellian?
But return once more to Professor Joh's privacy protestors who buy burner
phones or encrypt online communications because they feel indignation
toward the technological monitoring of their innocent activities. If they are to
be internally consistent, then such protestors should take even greater offense
at a live-person law enforcement official who purposefully occupies the same
room they are in, standing mere feet away. And they probably would. But
notice how the corresponding analog to that live-person law enforcement
official would be a live-person arbitrator, mediator, or judge. Put simply, if
surveillance is the problem, then that problem should be more acute when a
live person watches you than when a camera does.
And yet, we intuit that the attorney would not perceive the arbitrator who
presides over his arbitration as "surveilling him," even though the potential
and worry for surveillance should be at least equally present, if not more
salient, in a room with an arbitrator than one with just a camera. Why? I posit
that it is because video cameras, at least initially, carry a distinctively
Orwellian social meaning, but everyone seems to have accepted that an
arbitrator's presence at an arbitration is "normal," "ordinary," or otherwise
"just part of the rules of the game."
171 Joh, Privacy Protests, supra note 164, at 1017 ("Those engaged in privacy protests,
however, are not merely innocents who are caught up inadvertently....").
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2. Social Meaning & the "Orwell Effect"
Professor Lessig describes the "Orwell effect" thus "when people see that
the government or some relatively powerful group is attempting to manipulate
social meaning, they react strongly to resist any such manipulation."'' 7 2 That
the ABA would qualify as one such "relatively powerful group" seems clear
enough, but what would be the social meaning of placing a camera--or
requesting that one be placed-in the room before negotiations can
commence? For Professor Lessig, a message takes on different social
meanings depending on who the messenger is; nowhere does the messenger's
identity make for a starker contrast than when one messenger is "the
government" and another is not.173
So, consider what it would mean for a private negotiator to ask his
counterpart across the negotiating table "you don't mind if we record this on
film, do you?" One might imagine the following reflexive response "Why
would you need to do that? You don't trust me, is that what this is about?"
Like Professor Joh's privacy protestors or officers subject to Judge
Schendlin's decree, it's not hard to see how a negotiator who generally sees
herself as an honest person might legitimately infer insult from that request.
But from Professor Lessig's Orwell effect it need not necessarily follow
that when "the government" (i.e., the ABA, a "voluntary professional
organization") "4 formalizes the same request via a new Model Rule, a
negotiator bound by her licensing jurisdiction's adoption of the new Rule
would be more likely to infer an even greater insult from the new Rule than
from an individual counterparty's request.
Harken back for a moment to the last time you were surrounded by
cameras-at an airport. Chances are, you scarcely noticed any then, or
remembered any since, until just now. If so, then that would indicate that in an
airport, surveillance cameras have lost their Orwellian social meaning: if you
did loathe them as intrusive, you probably wouldn't forget it. Indeed, airports'
heightened security has long been engrained into airports' backdrop-and into
the public consciousness. However, you might have felt when the rules first
changed, today you can probably appreciate that they help ensure public
safety. They were installed not because the government doesn't trust you, or
the person seated next to you in coach, or anyone in particular.
Consider another security measure ubiquitous at airports: agents' searches
172 Lessig, supra note 159, at 1017.
171 See id at 1016 ("Speech by politicians is clearly less effective than speech by
nonpoliticians in persuading or convincing someone of some truth.").
174 American Bar Association, About the ABA, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/about the aba.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
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of your person and belongings. By now, most people "do not view it as a
violation of social norms for a government official to search their bags." '175
Consequently, "in airports, we submit to systematic examinations from
security personnel that we would not necessarily tolerate from private
acquaintances or even friends."17 6 Try to imagine how upset you'd be if you
learned that "the person in a uniform rummaging through [y]our suitcase was
not an official at all, but an acquaintance in disguise."' 77 But when it's a bona
fide government official, someone you hardly know, and certainly know less
well than you do your friends? However objectionable you might've found it
in the past,178 by now it's become so routine that you simply tolerate it as "the
price of admission."
As in airports, the camera rule, when first implemented, can start out as
the price of admission to a negotiation. As in airports, you find it easier to
stomach when it's the government who asks you to allow the camera than
when it's a friend. And as in airports, the camera will one day fall into the
backdrop of negotiations as its unseemliness fades.
Another ABA Model Rule followed just that evolutionary cycle: Rule 4.1.
Rule 4.1 has been around for a while now (since 1983, in fact).179 When a law
student or a newly minted lawyer learns of his obligations under it, he seems
unlikely to presume that the only reason the ABA would adopt a rule like Rule
4.1 is that the ABA does not trust him. A rulemaking body that enacts a new
rule to mandate or encourage honesty need not imply that any particular
attorney is dishonest.
Moreover, as explained above, an attorney who would oppose a new ABA
camera rule should air his true grievances against Rule 4.1 itself, since that
rule places far more substantive restrictions on his freedom than would my
procedural innovation mandating cameras. It follows that if an attorney
accepts Rule 4.1 in part because he does not perceive it as limiting his liberty,
then he should not see a new ABA rule mandating videotaping as such, either.
Nor should he have any reason to abhor it simply because it came from the
ABA.
In fact, the hypothetical exchange between private negotiators above
would suggest that the ABA has a comparative advantage over a single private
negotiator in influencing negotiators who might initially be skeptical to accept
175 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:




78 Id. at 1417 n. 336.
179 See Bordone, supra note 10, at 20.
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the video camera's role and place in the room. The ABA is a distant,
impersonal, and general body charged with overseeing and improving the legal
profession. 180Where a private negotiator can merely ask that her counterpart
agree to videotaping, thereby risking that her counterpart would perceive the
request as targeting him as someone untrustworthy, the ABA can broadly
mandate it for all attorneys, which would absorb or eliminate any connotations
of negative social meaning.
Here I borrow Professor Bordone's stipulation that such a rule be
mandatory.1 8' Not only would mandatory coverage allow negotiators to look
to public sanctions for enforcement instead of the rare private suit against the
rarer negotiating counterpart who would uncritically accept a request,18 2 it
would obviate the very need for a private negotiator to make that request at
all.
Under a mandatory regime, a negotiator who walks into the conference
room and notices her counterpart turn on or adjust the video recorder would
simply see it as within the "rules of the game." By becoming "the new
normal," a video recorder's presence in the room would no longer connote the
same social meaning of suspicion and mistrust as it does in the status quo
wherein one negotiator must initiate the request.
Therefore, my proposed rule is more akin to one of Professor Lessig's
more successful examples of a regulation that solved a collection action
problem by changing the social meaning that the regulated would impute to
the regulation's desired behavior. 183 He chronicles that for much of
professional hockey's history, "most hockey players did not wear helmets."' 84
Why might this be, given a helmet's obvious benefits? Because of the not-so-
obvious but costly social meaning-the stigma-associated with putting a
helmet on, which was seen as inconsistent with hockey players' macho self-
image.8 5 Some may deem hockey players' prioritizing their macho self-image
over their skulls' intactness to be pure folly, but that does not change the felt
reality that a hockey player who would volunteer to don a helmet in a
community and era wherein no one else did would uniquely suffer significant
stigmatic harms.1
8 6
So, the National Hockey League (N-L-in some ways the ABA of
180 American Bar Association, supra note 174.
1 Bordone, supra note 10, at 31.
182 See id at 30 (noting that individually adopting ethical codes by private contract
instead of by public mandate precariously depends on private enforcement via litigation).
183 Lessig, supra note 159, at 966.
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hockey players) "made it a rule that players wear helmets." ' 7 Thereafter,
everyone started wearing a helmet because putting one on no longer
telegraphed the same social meaning, nor sacrificed the same values, as it once
did. Thereafter, a player who's asked "Why do you wear a helmet? Don't you
know it makes you look un-macho?" can retain his image as a macho player
by simply answering that he wears one because the NHL's rules of the game
require him to wear one as a precondition to his participation in official NHL
games. Helmet-wearing thus became "the new normal"; whether you're about
to attend your first live game or reminiscing about the last time your favorite
NHL team won the Stanley Cup, you'd see a helmet-wearing skater and think
nothing of it, least of all that it once meant something else entirely.
There, hockey faced a collective action problem: no one particular player
wanted to be the brave pioneer to first don a helmet, because he alone would
bear the brunt of stigmatic social meaning. The NHL's rule, in making
everyone wear one, also made it easier for all players to accept gladly instead
of begrudgingly. Indeed, barely seven years after the NiL helmet rule took
effect, one player remarked that he was "glad [to] have an excuse to wear
one."
1 88
Likewise, the ABA, by mandating from afar this small addition to its rules
of the game as a condition to any negotiation (i.e., a video camera must be on
before any negotiation begins, just as all NHL players must have helmets on
before an NIL game can start), can solve the prisoners' dilemma wherein no
one negotiator wants to be the only one to initiate an insulting request or to
take a leap of faith. Once enacted, it will usher in negotiators' transition into a
new normal.
However, this transition will not take place overnight. Doubtless, a
negotiator who hasn't caught up with the latest continuing legal education
(CLE) or ABA updates, upon walking into a room, would surely notice a
blinking camera as an anomaly and demand that his counterpart explain, if not
remove it entirely. But the new ABA rule would supply a neutral authority to
appeal to: she might say "I was just as surprised when I learned about it as you
are now, and I didn't like it any more than you might, but it's a new ABA
requirement-see? It says so right here." The ABA can pitch the new rule not
as an omnipresent reminder that "somebody's watching" but as a facilitator,
or even as a prophylactic measure in place to protect well-meaning attorneys,
which each attorney thinks himself to be, from exploitation by bad apples.
Eventually, a camera in a negotiation room will surprise a negotiator no
187 Id. at 968 (citing N.H.L. Rules New Players Now Must Wear Helmets, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1979, at C14).
18 Id. (citing Craig Neff and Robert Sullivan, A Prescription for Safety, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 13, 1986, at 7) (emphasis added).
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more than an arbitrator would surprise a party to the arbitration. Once the
novelty of my new ABA rule wears off, it would simply be seen and accepted
as part of "the rules of the game." At that point, the camera would not bear an
Orwellian social meaning we might now instinctively associate with "camera
surveillance," any more than a hockey helmet implies its wearer's
"unmachoness," an implication that the NHL rule severed almost immediately
upon effectiveness, and certainly within seven years of its adoption. 8 9
Hence, videotaping need not carry a Big Brother-esque social meaning.
Nor need the ABA pitch it as, or attorneys receive it as, a limitation. Quite the
contrary, we should follow Professor Bordone's own paradigm shift: given
negotiation's emphasis on integrative problem solving, its ethical codes-its
'rules of the game'-are better conceptualized as "facilitators of particular
kinds of behaviors, attitudes, and conditions that ennoble" cooperation than as
constraints.' 90 Again, airport cameras are there to protect you and countless
others, not to keep an eye on you. Hockey helmets are worn to shield you, not
to slow you down, obscure your vision, or belittle anyone's machoness.
Thus conceived, a negotiator who resists the installation of a video camera
before each negotiation is not deemed "wrong" or somehow morally bad. 9 '
Rather, he is depriving himself of a prime advantage the rule would afford
him: "a professional environment in which practitioners are able to most
competently, efficiently, and successfully produce the best possible result."' 92
By excluding himself from just this environment, the negotiating attorney
would be subjugating his universally recited duty to zealously advocate for his
client's desired outcome to his own personal, but likely unwarranted and
inarticulable feeling of discomfort. And even this discomfort, which I
acknowledge as real just as pre-helmet NHL players' fear of social stigma was
real, will wane.
B. Practical Concerns
Having addressed theoretical objections suggesting that my proposal may
spark resistance and thus backfire, I now move onto practical concerns that are
likely to linger in the back of negotiators' minds, even those who broadly
accept the ABA's goals as worthwhile.
189 See id. at 967-68 (chronicling the N-L rule's introduction in 1979 and its
widespread acceptance by 1986, if not immediately).
'90 Bordone, supra note 10, at 9.
191 See id.
192 Id. at 9-10.
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1. Inconvenience
First, it seems elementary that requiring that a video camera be in the room
naturally presupposes a room hospitable to recording devices. Thus, a rule
requiring all negotiations to occur on camera might threaten to eliminate
negotiation in more informal settings (e.g., while seated next to one another
on a train or a plane, in a restaurant, or over the phone). I must acknowledge
that this would represent some loss of convenience, which is one of
negotiation's main advantages over stiffer courtroom settings. 93 Insofar as a
particular eleventh hour negotiation must occur between two attorneys seated
next to each other aboard an airplane in flight, they can reach a preliminary
but nonbinding agreement there and memorialize it later.
I would also caveat my proposal by establishing a dollar floor below which
no video recording is necessary. At this stage, I need not produce an exact
baseline to serve as the floor. The important aspect to appreciate is that this
caveat would exempt de minimis interactions.
Conversely, the rule would only apply to transactions above a certain
floor, reflecting the principle that "if it's worth lying for, it's worth having it
on camera." This use of minimum thresholds to exclude (or spare, depending
on one's perspective) wide swaths of claims from special or heightened rules
finds analogs in many areas of the law. For example, federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction may be invoked only if the amount-in-controversy exceeds
$75,000. 194 Similarly, financial regulation is often tiered to correspond to
regulated entities' size as measured in dollar amounts: the landmark Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 exempts from otherwise comprehensive regulatory regimes
financial institutions whose total assets fall below triggering floors. 195 An
appropriate demarcation line akin to an "amount-in-controversy" can serve not
only this proposal to videotape but also future ideas for refining the negotiation
process.
2. What About Phone & Email Negotiations?
In the past, an amount-in-controversy threshold might have sufficed to
leave untouched negotiations conducted over the phone and via email. Today,
193 Norton, supra note 14, at 506.
194 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011).
195 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1403 (2010)
(subjecting bank holding companies whose assets exceed $50 billion to special Federal
Reserve Regulations); see also Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an
Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1403
(2011) (critiquing whether the DFA set the threshold at the appropriate dollar amount).
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however, that may no longer be true, as "[f]ew negotiations are conducted
entirely in person."'196 Even among negotiations that begin as predominantly
in-person, "[m]ost include portions carried out through telephone and
email."' 97 This trend is unlikely to abate anytime soon, as those nimbler modes
of communication add flexibility and efficiency to negotiations.' 98 Users of
them might well wonder: would my rule ban telephonic and email
negotiations, as they cannot be videotaped?
Since phone calls and emails are not susceptible to a real-time monitor's
observation, it is true that social facilitation cannot influence negotiators to
behave more cooperatively ex ante. Regarding email, its written form provides
the sort of contemporaneous record that Judge Scheindlin hoped video
cameras would substitute for.' 99 Emails can also serve as their own evidence,
which lightens some of the difficulties of proof that currently plague Rule 4.1.
Thus, emails can strengthen ex post enforcement against deceptive email
negotiations, playing the same role videos play for in-person negotiations.
Phone negotiations are trickier, not least of all because they might be
subject to laws that require all parties to consent before any recording can
occur. Presumably, if a negotiating counterparty is willing to sit down with
you in person while the camera's rolling, that's a pretty good indicator of
consent. Not so with phone calls: if the person you're calling is a few time
zones away, you'd have to affirmatively ask for permission before you begin
recording.
My proposal seeks to preserve the flexibility inherent in phone calls and
emails. But leaving phone and email completely untouched would only invite
deceptive negotiators to engage in regulatory arbitrage, whereby they would
purposefully avoid in-person negotiations in order to avoid the video
requirement altogether. To dissuade this type of gamesmanship, telephonic
negotiators should insist that material facts discussed over the phone be
memorialized in the form of representations, warranties, and covenants.
Professor Mnookin himself recommends that negotiators use these contractual
elements to smoke out deception.200 Quite neatly, you can request that your
counterparty incorporate these provisions into an email contract. If ease of
communication (or fear of planes) were the true motivation behind his
avoidance of in-person negotiations, then he should have no reason to object
to forming an email contract with protective devices built in.
196 Charles B. Craver, How to Conduct Effective Telephone and E-Mail Negotiations,
17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 1 (2015).
197 Id.
198 See id at 6.
9 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
200 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 239.
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If, however, 1) your counterparty refuses to meet in-person at all, even for
signing and closing; 2) he refuses to accede to contractual provisions
guaranteeing the truth of what he said over the phone; and 3) the stakes were
high enough, then you can simply take your business elsewhere. After all,
you'd be prudent to refuse to commit to a lease or a large purchase over, say,
Craigslist without (at least) meeting your counterparty in-person and closely
inspecting his offering. That same prudence also applies here-again, if it's
worth lying about, it's certainly worth negotiating over in person and on
camera.
3. Confidentiality
Outside of their philosophical objections, attorneys feeling a camera's
gaze may also wonder: who else besides my negotiating partner, who's also
on this recording, will be able to access it? But my proposal need not introduce
more uncertainty as to what effects can fall into whose hands, since there are
already mechanisms in place to safeguard the videotapes from unauthorized
viewings.
For one thing, precisely because one's counterparty is also on the same
videotape, he will be seen as having discussed information about his own
client on camera. MRPC Rule 1.6 commands him to maintain his client's
confidentiality and to take reasonable steps to protect materials from
dissemination that may compromise that confidentiality."° Thus, well-settled
principles of attorney-client confidentiality already give him a self-interested
reason-and impose upon him a duty-to protect videotapes not only for his
counterpart's sake but for his own.
Attorneys are fully aware of their duty to maintain their clients'
confidentiality, but they may further ask: "Where am I to store the tapes? How
much would it cost?" Indeed, cost concerns may weigh particularly heavily on
attorneys who do not enjoy the financial resources of a large, for-profit
organization. But it turns out that storage costs may be quite minimal: Google
Drive, a leading electronic storage provider, offers every user 15 gigabytes
(GB) of space, free of charge.20 2 From there, users can purchase an extra
terabyte (1 TB, or 1,000 GBs) for $9.99/month. 2 3 To give you a sense of
perspective: Apple estimated that its 5th Generation iPod, released in 2005,
201 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT, r. 1.6 (AM. BAR. AsS'N 2016).
202 Google Drive Storage Plans & Pricing, Google,
https://support.google.com/drive/answer/2375123?hl=en&reftopic=14940 (last visited
May 4, 2016). Disclosure: The author has no interest, financial or otherwise, in Google,
Inc. or any other storage providers.
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can hold 75 hours of video in its 30 GBs.2 °4 Even if we were to assume that
video compression technology has not advanced in the decade since, Google
Drive's free 15 GBs can store more than 35 hours of video, and its $9.99 1 TB
plan can hold 2,500 hours, or 104 days of video. Storage costs are likely to
constitute no more than a drop in the bucket of a typical attorney's budget.
To the extent that the existing Rule 1.6 protections do not completely allay
attorneys' reservations, the ABA can make videos recorded pursuant to my
proposed ABA rule subject to an ABA-drafted, standardized, but customizable
nondisclosure agreement (NDA) that prohibits either negotiator from
publicizing the video except as necessary to establish that the other negotiator
had been deceptive or exploitative. Even then, the videotape can be introduced
as evidence only if a neutral judge (or ethics committee) reviews the video in
camera (pun intended) to screen out frivolous accusations offered as pre-
textual conduits to publicize another negotiator's tactics. This solution, too,
has a basis in preexisting MRPC: Rule 8.3 already obligates attorneys to report
to appropriate authorities instances of another attorney's ethical violations,
such as an insistence to conduct a negotiation with the camera off.2"5
Now, in one sense, it is true that people often request that a camera
currently on be turned off so that they may speak "candidly." One can imagine
a journalist's confidential source making just this request. But two aspects
differentiate a private negotiation from a journalist's interview of a
confidential source. First, a confidential source requests anonymity, or asks to
speak "off the record," often because he lacks authorization to make public
statements concerning a sensitive subject.2 0 6 Think of all the government
officials who speak on the condition of anonymity in leading national
newspapers. This is not the case with negotiators, for they invariably arrive at
the negotiating table having already received their clients' authorizations.2"7
Second, the journalist's purpose is to write a news story incorporating the
confidential source's information that could be read by the entire public. A
private negotiation, by contrast, is just that-private. Rule 1.6 duties and a new
standardized NDA only serve to emphasize negotiations' private nature. No
negotiation not intended to generate a buzz in, say, the Wall Street Journal,
should or would splatter across tomorrow's front page.
204 Kim Christensen & Terril Y. Jones, Launch of Video IPod Shines Light on Jobs,
Disney Drama, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005.
205 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT, r. 8.3 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2016).
206 See Margaret Sullivan, Op-Ed, The Disconnect on Anonymous Sources, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at SR 12
(questioning media's granting of anonymity as overbroad).
207 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 319.
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4. "Getting the ABA to Say Yes"
The last practical obstacle, as is often the case with any newly proposed
ABA rule, is to convince the ABA to actually adopt it. Presenting a wise
proposal is only the first step. As noted in the introduction, the ABA has
modified Rule 4.1 only slightly in its three decades of existence. Its Ethics
2000 Commission failed to enact broad reform. And the ABA recently rejected
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' push for
a new Uniform Collaborative Law Act (UCLA) in 2011 for reasons that
baffled some commentators. 8
But unlike the UCLA, I do not urge the ABA to create a large carve-out
that would allow either side to disqualify the other side's lawyer at any time
for any reason-a flaw the ABA cited in its rejection of the UCLA, perhaps
misunderstanding that that same feature is responsible for much of
collaborative law's success. 2 9 Instead, I merely propose an incremental
addition to negotiations that could go a long way toward solving intransigent
deception in negotiations. The ABA shares my interest in encouraging
attorneys to cooperate more with each other: The Ethics 2000 Commission's
recommended changes to Rule 4.1, though not ultimately as sweeping as some
would've liked, "clearly portray[ed] the Commission's desire for more truthful
lawyers. 21°
Even Professor James White, whose views of his time won the day against
a more stringent draft of Rule 4.1, recognizes that "to have [a negotiation rule]
so widely violated [would] be a continuing hypocrisy. ' 211 Well, Professors
Hinshaw and Alberts have demonstrated that Rule 4.1, diluted as it is, is still
violated widely enough to call into question the Rule's utility. 2 If for no other
reason, the ABA should at least consider a slight, virtually riskless tinkering
of its rules in order to improve clients' own opinions of the attorneys they seek,
whom the public thinks "less truthful than [are] most people.
213
218 See Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional
Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 365, 391 (2013) ("It would be
perfectly fitting to reject the resolution if the [ABA] believed that the [UCLA] was
inappropriate, perhaps because of drafting problems. But the debate.. .voiced three dubious
objections to the very idea of collaborative law .....
209 1d. at 393.
210 Martin & Dees, supra note 143, at 778.
211 Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 4, at 162.
212 Id.
213 Martin & Dees, supra note 143, at 779 (citing Edward D. Re, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction within the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 85, 87 (1994)).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
VI. CONCLUSION
Under my proposal, negotiators would and could do everything they
would normally do-just on film. 2 14 My proposal can be part of Professor
Bordone's MRPCN, or it can be tacked onto the existing Rule 4.1 that governs
negotiations within the extant MRPC. Its force derives from monitoring's
social facilitation of desirable behavior, a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon
which makes it portable to other domains of the law currently grappling with
their own ethical dilemmas. This portability may prove especially helpful in
the modem legal profession, one increasingly characterized by blurrier
boundaries delineating where conduct befitting the practice of law crosses
over into another realm altogether.
215
Indeed, implementing this one simple rule universally may even obviate
the need to have separate bodies of ethics for each lawyer-like activity (e.g., a
separate MRPCN), a segmentation that might introduce new risks associated
with line-drawing difficulties 216 and ethical arbitrage between discrete
segments as one sees fit.
217
Whether to subdivide the MRPC as Professor Bordone suggests is a topic
grander than this paper's modest aims. 218 What is clear is that the MRPC's
Rule 4.1 has not sufficed to rid negotiation of deception. My paper
recommends that the ABA require that all negotiations above a certain dollar
threshold occur only on camera, whose recordings will be protected by
attorney-client confidentiality and robust NDAs. If the ABA frames this rule
not as a constraint but as a facilitator (much as an airport's cameras are there
to protect you), the ABA can delink a video recorder from the Orwellian social
meaning ("I don't trust you; therefore, I must watch you") some skeptics may
otherwise assume. Freed from that social meaning, it should gradually come
to enjoy high compliance.
Once sanctioned, a video recorder would become embedded within "the
214 Perhaps negotiators inclined toward using profanity during negotiations would
change this habit if on film, but that's a risk worth taking.
215 See Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal Profession,
63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1246
(2014) ("[As] [1law and business grew together.... a murky and ambiguous boundary
zone replaced the once-crisp demarcation between the two.").
216 See Bordone, supra note 10, at 38 (acknowledging the challenge of ascertaining
"when negotiation ends and litigation begins").
217 Remus, supra note 215, at 1264.
218 See id at 1263 (faulting both the traditional litigation-intensive model and the
segmented model for focusing "narrowly and exclusively on the practice of law, and
fail[ing] to recognize and account for other, increasingly significant forms of lawyers'
work.").
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rules of the game." As negotiators become more accustomed to its presence, a
videotaped negotiation will constitute "the new normal." Even so, the
negotiating process may remain mostly a "private, self-policed market
process," as it has been for almost the entirety of its existence. 2 9 And there
may still be "no practical way to police ethical decisions from outside the
process.,, 22' But if my introduction of the video recorder succeeds in both
socially facilitating truthful behavior ex ante and easing ex post enforcement,
it will become a part of the negotiating process itself At that point, this one
additional procedural rule can regulate deception in negotiation more
effectively than can noble but impracticable substantive restrictions.
Thus, I submit videotaping negotiations as one practical way to police
ethical decisions from inside the process.
219 Norton, supra note 14, at 532.
220 Id.
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